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ABSTRACT
Spam websites are domains whose owners are not interested
in using them as gates for their activities but they are parked
to be sold in the secondary market of web domains. To
transform the costs of the annual registration fees in an op-
portunity of revenues, spam websites most often host a large
amount of ads in the hope that someone who lands on the
site by chance clicks on some ads. Since parking has be-
come a widespread activity, a large number of specialized
companies have come out and made parking a straightfor-
ward task that simply requires to set the domain’s name
servers appropriately.
Although parking is a legal activity, spam websites have
a deep negative impact on the information quality of the
web and can significantly deteriorate the performances of
most web mining tools. For example these websites can
influence search engines results or introduce an extra burden
for crawling systems. In addition, spam websites represent a
cost for ad bidders that are obliged to pay for impressions or
clicks that have a negligible probability to produce revenues.
In this paper, we experimentally show that spam websites
hosted by the same service provider tend to have similar
look-and-feel. Exploiting this structural similarity we face
the problem of the automatic identification of spam websites.
In addition, we use the outcome of the classification for com-
piling the list of the name servers used by spam websites so
that they can be discarded before the first connection just
after the first DNS query. A dump of our dataset (includ-
ing web pages and meta information) and the corresponding
manual classification is freely available upon request.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
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tection
General Terms
Clustering, Metric space, classification
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1. INTRODUCTION
Spam websites are not necessarily long lists of commer-
cial links pointing to some sponsor web site, but they can
be fake web portals where ads are diluted with false free ser-
vices such as: weather forecasts, news, personalized search.
Most often, spam websites look like web directories where
one side of the site contains links with anchors in such a
way related to the domain topic and the other side contains
ads organized as search results. The purpose of this layout
is to capture clicks that distracted users make by chance.
Among the main goals of spam websites there is to park
domains keeping them reserved for selling purposes. As a
result, parked domain owners typically have to manage a
large portfolio of names. In order to allow a simple man-
agement of large groups of domains, specialized companies
have come out in recent years. The parking procedure is
straightforward; it is suffice to change the name server en-
tries of the domain redirecting them to those of the domains
parking provider (DPP) or to insert a redirection from the
home page to an appropriate page of the DPP.
This simple procedure, the low price of domains, and the
potentially high revenues [10] are among the causes for the
increase of the number of networks of spam websites. These
websites have shown to be able to compromise the quality of
results of search engines [4]. For example, they are respon-
sible of a considerable waste of resources spent in crawling,
indexing and ranking [12].
Spam websites hosted by a certain DPP tend to be similar
to each other, but they are not identical. In fact, DPPs offer
a range of possible customizations of the web template and
color scheme. In certain cases, the web template can be in-
spired to commonly used CMS templates with the purpose
of appearing more familiar to the users and, thus, increas-
ing the probability of receiving some clicks on their ads. In
some cases spam websites do not look like web directories,
but they look like fake web portals or free mail services.
The visual similarity between spam domains and web direc-
tories or mail portals makes the task of identifying them by
inspecting their content challenging.
According to the above procedure, it is sufficient a single
DNS query or the download of the sole home page to dis-
criminate whether a website is spam or not. In fact, if the
name servers belong to a DPP or the home page contains a
redirection to a page attributable to a DPP, the website can
be safely classified as spam. To the best of our knowledge,
1447
lists of DPP name servers are not publicly available. It is
possible to find on the web only partial and sloppy lists fre-
quently not updated. As a result, an automatic toot able to
compile and update a reliable list of DPP name servers has
become a need.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach, compared to
content based ones, to the identification of spam websites.
We do not try to classify a website according to the pres-
ence/absence of common structural characteristics of spam
websites, but we exploit the fact that websites hosted by a
certain DPP tend to be similar to each other and, thus, they
can be partitioned obtaining clusters with a homogeneity
factor much higher than normal websites hosted by general
internet service providers (ISPs).
To partition the websites in clusters, we used an improved
version of the FPF [7] algorithm for the k-center problem.
For each cluster we used the average distance from the cen-
ter as an approximate measure of the homogeneity of the
cluster. We empirically observed that service providers com-
pletely devoted to spam have a very low average distance (as
low as less than 0.2) for all clusters, while name servers used
for both web hosting and spamming, still maintain the low
average distance for the clusters of spam websites and have
a sensible higher average distance for all the other clusters.
As a result, we can use this measure as a criterion to dis-
criminate and classify each cluster.
Another important contribution of this paper is the defini-
tion of a distance among pairs of web pages able to capture
their structural differences regardless the text contained in
the pages. Moreover, since our distance definition requires
a quadratic computation in the number of tags of the web
pages, we defined an upper bound that can be computed in
linear time.
With the purpose of facilitating reproducibility of our
experiments and allowing future development of novel ap-
proaches to web spam detection, we made all the collected
web pages and the corresponding manual classification avail-
able upon request.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives
a brief survey of related work, while section 3 describes in
detail our approach, the distance function and the clustering
algorithm. Section 4 shows our experimental results. In
section 5 we draw some conclusions.
2. RELATED WORK
Due to its economic and user-related implications, web
spam detection has attracted the attention of scientists in
last ten years. Different types of spam require different ap-
proaches [8]. The most common approach is based on the
text content analysis exploiting the fact that spam pages
tend to share some common characteristics. In [1] the au-
thor presents a text content based approach to classify ads-
portals. The author defined a set of markers (anchor text
ratio, anchor text ratio, etc.) that are more likely to be
revealing of spam websites. In [9] the authors analyze the
“.biz”TLD developing a classifier based on the use of regular
expressions to identify specific patterns that are more likely
to be present in spam websites. In [13] the authors train a
pool of classifiers to detect a variety of web spam types all
belonging to the category of parking.
In [3] the authors combine link-based and content-based
features. They observed that linked hosts tend to belong to
the same class: either both are spam or both are non-spam.
The only work comparable with our approach is [15] where
the authors test several similarity measures based on the
identification of web templates. They also propose a fin-
gerprinting technique and a clustering algorithm for large
collection of documents based on these measures. The simi-
larity of the two approaches consists in the assumption that
spam pages tend to cluster together.
3. OUR APPROACH
3.1 Metric space
A visual inspection of websites hosted by the same DPP
and using the same template, shows that they have an im-
pressively similar look-and-feel even if they have no text in
common. For example they can have a similar menu bar
in the same position with the same number of bold entries,
but, potentially, with completely different labels depending
on the commodity sector of the website. It is sometimes pos-
sible that two websites have some slight local differences. For
example one displays a forecast weather box and the other
has a fake mail login form. A distance function, therefore,
has to capture all these aspects.
We derived our distance function from a modified version
of the global sequence alignment score as defined in [11].
In short, the global alignment of two sequences consists of
filling them with gaps in the appropriate positions in order
to minimize their hamming distance. Instead of using a
character-wise comparison that can be subjected to noise
due to the insertion of spurious characters on the web pages,
we strip out the text and split the web pages into tokens
using HTML tags as base elements for the comparison.
Let p1 = {p1,1, . . . , p1,n} and p2 = {p2,1, . . . , p2,m} be two
web pages such that pi,j is the j-esim tag of page pi; the
global alignment algorithm builds a n + 1 × m + 1 matrix
S (called similarity matrix) containing in position (i, j) the
alignment score of the i-long prefix of page p1 and j-long
prefix of p2. Each local judgement consists of maximizing
the alignment score by deciding if matching/mismatching
p1,i and p2,j or inserting a gap in one of the two pages. A
score value, depending on the application goal, is assigned to
each decision. In our case, since we want to define a similar-
ity proportional to the number of matched elements between
the pages, we assign a score of smatch = 1 to the match and a
score of 0 to the other operations, thus smismatch = sgap = 0.
The matrix is filled from left to right and from top to
bottom. Consider the case where we are aligning p1,i and
p2,j . If we fill p1 with a gap, we have S[i, j] = S[i, j−1]+sgap.
Symmetrically, by inserting a gap in p2 we obtain S[i, j] =
S[i − 1, j] + sgap. The score in case of alignment depends
on the content of the aligned tokens. In fact, if p1,i = p2,j ,
then the score S[i, j] = S[i − 1, j − 1] + smatch, otherwise
S[i, j] = S[i − 1, j − 1] + smismatch. In order to maximize
the overall alignment score the algorithm decides for the
maximum of the above values. By using our scoring scheme
we have:
S[i, j]=
{
max(S[i−1, j], S[i, j− 1], S[i− 1, j− 1]) if p1,i 6=p2,j
S[i− 1, j− 1]+1 if p1,i=p2,j
The element Sˆ = S[i + 1][j + 1] is the global alignment
score for pages p1 and p2. As defined here, Sˆ is a measure of
similarity dependent on the size of the smallest web page and
it is bounded in the range [0,min(|p1|, |p2|)]. To normalize Sˆ
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to be size-independent and turn it into a distance we define
the following:
D(pi, pj) = 1− Sˆ
max(|p1|, |p2|)
3.1.1 Efficient Distance Approximations
The distance D has two practical disadvantages: 1) it
takes O(n2) time and space even for comparing pages that
are evidently different, 2) it requires that the entire HTML
pages are loaded in the main memory. We describe here an
approximated distance function that requires a linear time
pre-processing to produce compact fingerprints of the pages
that can be maintained in RAM and a constant time compu-
tation of the distance. For a page pi we build its fingerprint
fi as a vector of 11 elements so that fi[k] counts the num-
ber of tags of length k in the page pi and fi[11] counts the
number of tags longer than 10 characters. In this case we
consider only the tag keywords ignoring possible parameters.
We define the distance between fingerprints fi and fj as:
F (pi, pj) = 1−
(
(
∑11
k=1 min(fi[k], fj [k])
max(|p1|, |p2|)
)
We observe that the factor
∑11
k=1 min(fi[k], fj [k]) is upper
bounded by the number of tags of the smallest page and it
is an over-estimation of the number of matched tags in the
quadratic alignment. The divisive factor of the above for-
mula, instead, is used to normalize the measure with respect
to the number of tags of the bigger page (as in the quadratic
distance).
A more rough approximation of the above distance func-
tions can be obtained by the following definition:
R(pi, pj) = 1− min(|pi|, |pj |)
max(|pi|, |pj |) (1)
In this case the numerator of the fraction is the size of
the shortest page that is the upper bound of the number of
possible matches. Although the formula in (1) could be con-
sidered a too rough approximation of the structural distance
between two pages, it can be used as a filter for our purposes
where the target is not the clustering in itself. In fact, since
it holds that R ≤ F ≤ D, if R(pi, cj) is high enough to
decide that page pi is too far from the center µj , then the
computation of D() becomes unnecessary. According to the
above consideration, we performed our clustering by using
the three distance definitions R(), F () and D() in cascade
stopping when one of these distances returns a value higher
than a certain threshold δ. Although different values of the
threshold can influence the selection of the centers, our ex-
periments have shown that δ has no influence on the final
prediction.
3.2 Clustering algorithm
Clustering is the activity of dividing a set of objects into
homogeneous groups according to their distance. Results
strongly depend on: the definition of a distance function
able to capture the differences among objects as well as the
objective function that the clustering algorithm attempts to
minimize/maximize.
In our application the goal of clustering is to highlight
highly homogeneous clusters. As observed in [16] an hint
of the homogeneity of a cluster can be obatained from its
cluster radius. As a result, we used an algorithm optimizing
the k-center problem (i.e. the problem of selecting from a
set S a subset µ of k elements {µ1, . . . , µk} ⊂ S that induces
a non-overlapping partitioning such that the radius of the
widest cluster is minimized) for clustering.
In [7] the author shows that the k-center problem is NP-
hard and gives a 2-competitive algorithm (Furthest point
first (FPF)) that requiresO(nk) distance computations. This
algorithm is proven to be optimal unless P = NP . As in
[6] we used a heuristic version of the furthest point first al-
gorithm that, exploiting the triangular inequality in metric
spaces, is able to speed up the computation.
3.2.1 The M-FPF algorithm
The FPF algorithm builds its clustering incrementally: at
each step it selects as a new center the element maximizing
the distance to its assigned center. Once a new center is
chosen, the clustering is updated. This latter step dominates
the computational cost requiring O(n) distance invocations.
The heuristic version of the FPF algorithm (later referred
as M-FPF) attempts to reduce the number of distance com-
putations for both the selection of a new center and the
clustering update.
Let Ci = C(µi) be the set of elements of S closest to
a center µi. By keeping Ci as a list, sorted according to
the distance to the center µi, we can easily compute each
cluster radius in time O(1) and select the new center by
simply ranking the clusters’ radiuses.
Once a new center µy is selected, the clustering can be
updated by scanning each list Ci in decreasing order of dis-
tance from µi. By the triangular inequality we can stop
scanning the list Ci when we reach an element x satisfying
the condition:
D(x, µi) ≤ 1
2
D(µi, µy) (2)
because the remaining elements of Ci cannot be closer to µy
than µi. Notice that the distances among all the pairs of
centers are required, thus introducing an extra O(k2) com-
putational cost. Figure 1 shows an example where there are
two centers (in red) and an element (in blue) satisfying the
condition in (2).
µi µy
p
1
2
D(µi, µy)
D(µi, p)
D(µi, µy)
Figure 1: Example of element satisfying the condition in (2)
We experimentally observed (see sec. 4.3) that the con-
dition in (2) is more likely to be quickly satisfied refining
a cluster of spam websites where most of the elements are
very similar (when not identical) to the cluster center. As
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a result, our heuristic tends to be more effective when the
quadratic distance function is mostly used.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we show the results of an empirical eval-
uation of our websites classification system. We performed
a crawling with our proprietary crawler running on a clus-
ter of 6 Mac mini endowed with 16Gb of RAM and a 2.4
Ghz IntelTMprocessor. Clusterings were made on a Mac pro
endowed with 64Gb of RAM 1 and IntelTMXEON 12-cores.
In order to assess our algorithm performances against the
state of the art, we compared our method with the LSH-
fingerprint clustering algorithm described in [15] which, at
the best of our knowledge, is the most similar approach to
our. In our experiments we do not make any claim on the
running time of the competitor algorithm since in the origi-
nal work there are no references to the execution time. Since
the algorithm in [15] is influenced from the choice of some
parameters, we decided to use the same values suggested by
the authors in their work.
4.1 Dataset description
Evaluating performances of spam classification algorithms
poses many thorny problems. The first important issue is
the absence of a recent representative labelled snapshot of
home pages including both DNS and HTML information.
Recrawling existing datasets (i.e. [2]) can result in an inac-
curate classification due to possible changes of the content
or owner of some web pages after the manual classification.
In our case, this caused the need of an expensive manual
evaluation of the dataset.
Another critical aspect is the exact definition of spam
website. In fact, according to the most restrictive defini-
tion, these websites contain ads. However, in some cases we
found that certain websites are clearly lacking of useful con-
tent except for the contact information of website’s owner
even if these websites do not contain any ads. In some other
cases a web site consists only of a courtesy page of the ser-
vice provider (most often containing ads). In these cases,
discriminating whether a domain is spam or it has been reg-
istered for the impending publication of a new website is
impractical. In our manual labeling we used a conservative
approach. When it was possible to establish with certainly
that a domain was reserved for potential future use (even
without ads) we classified it as spam, otherwise we classified
it as not spam even if it was lacking of content.
To build our collection we performed an extensive web
crawling obtaining a collection of 1, 076, 079 valid home pages
belonging to 93 distinct internet service providers. These
home pages and service providers have been evaluated using
a human-supervised semi-automatic procedure.
We iteratively requested a pool of volontiers to evaluate a
certain number of random unlabelled pages in the dataset.
In order to avoid influencing the human evaluator, she had
no information about the service provider. Similarly to [17],
these labelled pages have been used as seeds to induce a
clustering where two pages belong to the same cluster if
they have approximately the same tag structure. Notice
that pages not similar enough to some seed are not assigned
to any cluster. Singletons (namely clusters with only the
1a single clustering process could allocate only 32Gb of RAM
due to manufacturer limitations.
seed element) and clusters of duplicates have been labelled
according to the human evaluation. For the remaining clus-
ters (i.e. clusters with radious higher than 0) we asked the
human expert to evaluate at least another random page. If
all the evaluations of a cluster agree to each other the pages
belonging to the cluster have been labelled. The procedure
has been repeated until all the pages had been labelled. At
the end of the evaluation procedure our dataset consisted in
917, 581 non-spam pages and 158, 498 spam pages. Service
providers have been divided into categories (namely: SPAM,
ISP) according to the label of the majority of hosted do-
mains. As a result of the classification, our dataset consists
of 77 providers labelled as ISP, and 16 classified as SPAM.
4.2 Parameters tuning
Parameter and threshold setting can become a compli-
cated task because they can profoundly affect the outcome
of an algorithm. As for most clustering based tasks we have
to choose the number k of clusters in which to partition the
domains belonging to a service provider. Moreover we need
to set a threshold δ to classify each cluster as containing
spam or regular domains. The prediction of the number of
clusters is a well studied problem in the literature [14] even
if a generally accepted approach is still on the horizon.
In this section we experimentally show that the choice of
the number of clusters is not critical for us because our algo-
rithm proven to be robust to the change of this parameter.
Furthermore, we show that the average radiuses of spam
website clusters and regular website clusters belong to well-
separated ranges. As a result, setting the value of δ arises
as a natural choice.
We select 7 among the biggest service provider in our
dataset. Three of them are explicitly used for spamming
(two of them have the substring parking as part of their
name and one is a well-known domain parking provider).
The other four NSs belong to general ISPs. In order to bet-
ter assess a good estimation of δ we included the NS of one of
the most used content management system (CMS) provider
(namely wordpress) in this latter set. This choice is moti-
vated by the fact that we expect a higher degree of structural
similarity among web pages created using the same CMS and
consequently a lower average radius.
Let R(Ci) be the radius of the cluster Ci and let |Ci| be
the number of elements of the cluster. Fixing the number of
desired clusters to k, we compute the average radius as the
weighted sum of the cluster radiuses:
Rˆk =
k∑
i=1
|Ci|R(Ci)
Since our distance definition is normalized to belong to
the range [0, 1], Rˆk belongs to the same interval.
Figure 2 shows Rˆk for various assignment of k. We ob-
serve that spam service providers have an average radius
constantly much lower than general ISPs for each possible
assignment of k. The figure also shows a smooth trend of
the average radius that, for k > 16 decreases quite slowly
for both spam and non-spam websites. This confirms that
the choice of k is not critical and suggests that k = 16 could
be a good choice in general.
Figure 2 also gives an important hint about the choice of
the value δ used as threshold to discriminate spam clusters
versus general ISPs. All the spam service providers show
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Figure 2: Average cluster radius. In red results for NS de-
voted to SPAM, in blue results for general purpose ISP.
an average radius lower than 0.2 while general ISPs have an
average radius higher than 0.3. According to this behaviour
we set δ = 2.5.
Finally, figure 2 confirmed that our similarity function is
also able to classify web sites generated by means of CMSs
correctly. In fact, despite that the average distance for the
NS Wordpress is lower than the other general ISPs, it is
consistently higher than 0.3 for all the assignments of k.
4.3 Running time evaluation
Although clustering time is not a critical performance pa-
rameter, it still influences the overall classification time and
thus, the possibility to keep the list of spam websites up-
dated. In fact, the overall classification time is the sum of
the clustering times of all the service providers.
A formal assessment of the ability of our sequence of upper
bounds to reduce the number of quadratic distance compu-
tations, and thus the clustering time, is impractical because
it completely depends on the input data. Thus, we carried
out an experimental performance assessment. For each ser-
vice provider we measured the distribution of the calls to
the three distance functions R(), F () and D(). Although
calling D() is subordinate to calling F () which in turn is
subordinate to invoking R(), for the sake of comparison we
counted only the number of invocations as a last distance
function of the sequence. In table 1 we report these distri-
bution as percentages dividing them according to the name
server classification. We also include the overall number of
distance calls and the running time.
Class Metric # dist. Running
R F D calls. time
ISP 71.41 14.84 13.75 33.93M 17:35:55.49
SPAM 15.49 5.26 79.25 8.69M 40:25.43
Total 60.02 12.88 27.10 42.62M 18:16:20.92
Table 1: Distribution of the number calls to the three dis-
tance measures. Last two column reports: the overall num-
ber of distance calls (in million) and the overall running time
in hh:mm:ss.cent.
As table 1 shows, for the most time-demanding class (ISP)
most of the times (more than 70%) the approximation re-
turned by calling the function R() is a fair accurate approx-
imation of the distance between two web pages. Further-
more, although the overall contribution of the function F ()
to the reduction of the number of calls to D() is limited if
compared to R(), it is still good enough for more than 1/2
of the distances not fairly approximated by R(). As a result
of the combination of the two approximated distances, the
expensive quadratic distance D() is called only the 13.75%
of the times.
As expected, the class SPAM shows a different distribu-
tion. In fact, the number of calls to distance D() dominates
the overall number of distance invocation. Nevertheless, in
this case the overall running time is not heavly affected from
these calls because of the beneficial effect of the optimization
of equation 2 in the M-FPF algorithm.
4.4 Classification Evaluation
In this section we report the classification performance in
terms of f-measure and accuracy of our method and compare
it with the LSH-fingerprint algorithm described in [15].
We made two levels of evaluation:
• Service provider level: we labelled each service provider
according to the class predicted by the majority of the
corresponding websites. This evaluation is aimed at
measuring the ability of each algorithm to predict the
list of service providers devoted to spam.
• Website level: we compared the prediction for each
website with the corresponding human judgement. This
analysis allows the measuring of the probability of a
website to be misclassified.
In regards to the first evaluation, as shown in table 2, our
method has demonstrated to be able to approximate the
human judgement with a very high confidence level obtain-
ing, in terms of both f-measure and accuracy, an increase of
about 5% over the state of the art. This result is particularly
important for all those applications exploiting the web as a
source of data to be used to build a knowledge base [5]. In
fact, in this case what really matters is not the complete list
of regular websites, but the avoidance of the introduction of
low quality documents into the knowledge base.
f-measure Accuracy
Our 0.9178 0.9062
LSH 0.8670 0.8541
Table 2: F-measure and accuracy of our method and LSH
clustering for the service provider level assessment.
In other cases, for example for spam filters, classifying
all the domains belonging to a certain service provider with
the same label could be too rough and could potentially in-
troduce a non-negligible amount of false positives and false
negatives. While for filtering applications the misclassifica-
tion of a spam website is typically non-problematic because
its effect is only the potential visualization of some unwel-
come website, false positives may represent a problem be-
cause they can cause the inaccessibility of legal contents. In
contrast, for parental controll appllications the presence of
false positive can represent a problem.
According to table 3 the rate of false negative of both
methods is in the order of 3%. An in-depth examination of
these missclassified websites show that they are often clus-
ters of nearly empty pages, HTTP errors and other non-
informative pages that, however, can not be considered as
spam. Instead, the two methods show a large difference in
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Our LSH
ISP Spam ISP Spam
Human eval.
ISP 82.21 3.06 61.56 3.35
Spam 0.65 14.08 23.70 11.39
Table 3: Confusion matrix of the website level assessment
of both methods expressed as percentages.
the rate of false positive predictions. In fact, our algorithm is
able to bound the misclassified websites under the threshold
of 1% while the LSH exceed the 20%. We believe that this
low rate of false positive predictions makes our algorithm a
relialable tool for critical applications such as parental con-
trol filters.
For the reader convenience we report in table 4 the results
of the website level assessment also in terms of f-measure and
accuracy. As seen before, the large difference between the
two algorithms is due to the impact of false positive.
f-measure Accuracy
Our 0.9640 0.9628
LSH 0.6925 0.7294
Table 4: F-measure and accuracy of our method and LSH
clustering for the website level assessment.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a novel clustering-based ap-
proach to the identification of spam websites. The novelty
of our approach stands in the fact that we observed that
these websites are not similar to each other in general, but
this similarity is highly evident among websites hosted by
the same DPP. Moreover, we do not make a-priori assump-
tions about the content of spam websites, this makes our
approach robust to changes due to technological evolution.
We also defined a metric able to capture the structural sim-
ilarity among pairs of web pages. We believe that our met-
ric can find other applications in Web information retrieval.
We show how the quadratic computation of our distance
can be easily overestimated in linear time without affecting
the overall clustering quality. As a result our metric can be
employed in practical applications where hundreds of thou-
sands of websites have to be clustered. Finally, we built a
manually curated dataset of spam websites that can be used
for further research.
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